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This paper considers a public good game with heterogeneous endowments
and incomplete information a⁄ected by extreme free-riding. We overcome this
problem through the implementation of a contest in which several prizes may
be awarded. We identify a monotone equilibrium, in which the contribution
is strictly increasing in the endowment. We prove that it is optimal for the
social planner to set the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise total expected
contribution is invariant to the prize structure. Finally, we show that private
provision via a contest Pareto-dominates public provision and is higher than
the total contribution raised through a lottery.
1 Introduction
This paper looks at multiple prize contests as a way to overcome the free-riding
problem. It is well known that the public good provision resulting from individual
voluntary contributions is generally sub-optimal, because of the incentive to free-
ride associated with positive externalities (e.g. see Bergstrom et al., 1986; Andreoni,
1988). While fund-raising mechanisms based on tax rewards and penalties can be
designed to solve this problem (e.g. Groves and Ledyard, 1977; Walker, 1981), they
are not available to private organisations with no coercive power, such as chari-
ties or civic groups. Contests as incentive mechanisms are di⁄erent from the above
solutions because no power to enforce sanctions is required on the part of the in-
stitution conducting the tournament. Contests are competitions in which agents
spend resources in order to win one or more prizes. The main characteristic is that,
independently of success, all participants bear some costs.
A number of recent studies have explored di⁄erent incentive based fund-raising
mechanisms both theoretically and through laboratory experiments. These studies
have focused on the use of lotteries (e.g. Morgan, 2000; Morgan and Sefton, 2000),
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1the comparison between winner-pay and all-pay auctions with one prize (e.g. Goeree
et al., 2005) and between lotteries and one prize all-pay auctions (e.g. Orzen, 2005).
Morgan (2000) studies a lottery mechanism where one prize is awarded as a way
to overcome the free-riding problem. Contributions to the public good entitle to
lottery tickets, one ticket is randomly drawn and holder wins the prize. The public
good consists of the revenue of the lottery net of the value of the prize. He considers
a model with quasilinear preferences where all players contribute the same amount
in equilibrium, independently of their income.
Goeree et al. (2005) compare the results of a winner-pay and an all-pay auc-
tion with one prize with a lottery. They study a public good game with a linear
production function where agents are unconstrained and have heterogeneous pref-
erences which are private information. The authors show that the all-pay auction
dominates both the other mechanisms.
The puzzle with the equilibrium de￿ned in Morgan (2000) is that it predicts
that agents with di⁄erent incomes contribute the same amount. This pattern does
not seem to properly describe reality, while it seems more plausible that individu-
als with higher incomes contribute more than what poorer ones do1. On the other
hand, Goeree et al. (2005) do not explore the behaviour of agents with heteroge-
neous endowments. Contrary to these analyses, in the present study we identify
an equilibrium in which the contribution is strictly increasing in the endowment.
Furthermore, although there exists a large literature which analyses the use of mul-
tiple prize contests and tournaments as incentive schemes2, their use as fund-raising
mechanisms has not been explored.
Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study a multiple prize contest where unconstrained
agents di⁄er in the ability to exert e⁄ort, and the ability is private information.
They show that when costs are either linear or concave allocating only one prize
maximises the total expected e⁄ort exerted by the bidders, while when costs are
convex more prizes could be optimal. However, the paper on multiple prize contests
most closely related to ours is the one by Barut and Kovenock (1998), who study
symmetric multiple prize all-pay auctions with complete information. They extend
the analysis of ￿rst price all-pay auctions with complete information3 and show that,
when players are not constrained, only mixed strategy equilibria exist. Further,
expected expenditures are maximised by driving the value of the lowest prize to
zero, but are invariant across all con￿gurations leaving the lowest value ￿xed and
the sum of the values constant.
In this paper we consider a public good game with a linear production func-
1Interestingly, so far experiments on lotteries as a way to ￿nance public goods have only focused
on the case of subjects with homogeneous endowments (see, for instance, Morgan and Sefton, 2000;
Orzen, 2005).
2Applications have been made to promotions in labour markets (Lazear and Rosen, 1981), tech-
nological and research races (Wright, 1983; Dasgupta, 1986; Taylor, 1995; Fullerton and McAfee,
1999; Windham, 1999), credit markets (Breocker, 1990), and rent seeking (Tullock, 1980) among
others.
3The ￿rst price all-pay auction with complete information has been utilised extensively in the
literature (Dasgupta, 1986; Hillman and Samet, 1987; Hillman and Riley, 1989; Ellingsen, 1991;
Baye et al., 1993). There exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium and a complete characterisation
of its equilibria appears in Baye et al. (1996).
2tion (as in Goeree et al., 2005) where agents have heterogenous endowments which
are private information. Such a game is a modi￿ed version of the game with com-
plete information which is typically employed in public good experiments. Each
agent chooses how much of her wealth to allocate to the public good; this money
is multiplied by a parameter, which takes a value between one and the number of
players, and shared equally among all the agents. The unique Nash equilibrium is to
contribute nothing, although it is socially optimal to contribute all the wealth. We
overcome this extreme free-riding via a contest where several prizes may be awarded.
We assume that the social planner has access to a small4 budget, which can be al-
located in form of prizes. The ￿rst prize is awarded to the player who contributes
the most, the second prize to the player with the second highest contribution and
so on until all prizes are awarded. The social planner determines the prize structure
in order to maximise expected total welfare net of the value of the total prize sum.
Heterogeneity and incomplete information enable us to characterise a monotone
equilibrium, in which the contribution is strictly increasing in the endowment. Such
an equilibrium is a puri￿cation of the mixed strategy equilibrium identi￿ed by Barut
and Kovenock (1998) in a symmetric setting with complete information and uncon-
strained agents. Our prediction seems more plausible than a completely symmetric
equilibrium, either in mixed or in pure strategies. We prove that it is optimal for the
social planner to set the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise total expected con-
tribution is independent of the distribution of the total prize sum among the prizes.
We show that the contest is a budget balanced incentive mechanism: expected total
contribution is higher than the value of the total prize sum. There exists a critical
level of the budget under which the monotone equilibrium exists independently of
the prize structure. For any possible distribution of the endowments we identify
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the total prize sum to be below this critical
level. Finally we prove that private provision via a contest Pareto-dominates public
provision and is higher than total contribution in a lottery.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a linear public
good game with complete information, as it is usually employed in public good ex-
periments. In Section 3 we present the model and identify the Nash equilibrium. In
Section 4 we solve the designer￿ s problem and discuss the existence of the equilib-
rium. Section 5 compares private provision via a contest with both public provision
and private provision in a lottery. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Linear Public Good Game with Complete In-
formation
In this section we present the game which is typically used in public good experi-
ments. n subjects take part in the experiment. Each subject is endowed with the
same amount of money z and simultaneously chooses how much of her wealth to
4We focus on cases where fund-raisers auction prizes of relatively low value. This seems to be
the main source of revenue for most charities. See for example Goeree et al (2005), who provide
data showing that the vast majority of fund-raisers seek small donations from a large number of
donors.
3allocate to the public good; this money is multiplied by a parameter ￿ and shared
equally among all the subjects. Agent i￿ s payo⁄ can be described by
Ui = z ￿ gi + ￿
G
n
where gi is i￿ s contribution to the public good and G =
n X
i=1
gi is the total level
of public good. If ￿ 2 (1;n) an individual￿ s opportunity cost of contributing to the
public good exceeds the marginal return of investing in the public good. Thus, the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game is to contribute nothing, while it is e¢ cient to
contribute all the wealth.
3 The Model
Let us consider n players. Each player i is assumed to have endowment zi, which
is private information. Endowments are drawn independently of each other from
the interval [0;1] according to the distribution function F(z), which is common
knowledge, with mean E[z]. We assume that F(z) has a continuous and bounded
density F
0(z) > 0. Players play a public good game in which each individual has
to choose how much to contribute to the public good. At the same time they take
part in a contest in which n prizes are awarded such that ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿m￿1 >
￿m = ￿￿￿ = ￿n ￿ 0, 1 < m ￿ n and
n X
j=1
￿j = ￿. This assumption rules out the
possibility of awarding n equal prizes and will enable us ￿nd an equilibrium. We
will call ￿ = (￿1;￿￿￿ ;￿n) 2 Rn the vector of prizes. The player with the highest
contribution wins ￿1, the player with the second highest contribution wins ￿2, and
so on until all the prizes are allocated. For each player, a strategy g(z) will be the
contribution to the public good as a function of the player￿ s endowment and the
action space for player i will be the interval [0;zi]. If player i, who has endowment
zi and contributes gi, wins prize j her payo⁄ is




where ￿ 2 (1;n). Given the value assumed by ￿, notice that the equilibrium in
the absence of a contest is the same as in the game described in Section 2.
Each player i chooses her contribution in order to maximise expected utility
(given the other players￿contributions and given the values of the di⁄erent prizes).
We will assume that ￿ is exogenously determined. For a given value of ￿, the social
planner determines the number of prizes having positive value and the distribution
of the total prize sum among the di⁄erent prizes in order to maximise the expected
value of total welfare net of the value of ￿ (given the players￿equilibrium strategy
functions).
We will focus on the case in which the equilibrium strategy g(z) is less than z
for any type z on the interval [0;1]. In order to ￿nd the equilibrium of the game it












Given a vector of prizes ￿, K(F(z)) is a linear combination of n order statistics
with weights equal to the prizes. If all agents adopt the same strictly increasing
strategy g(z), K(F(z)) represents the expected prize of the player with endowment
z. The following result will help us identify the equilibrium of the game.
Lemma 1 The function K(F(z)) is strictly monotonic increasing in z.
Proof. Let￿ s consider zi and zj such that 0 ￿ zi < zj ￿ 1. Given that F(zi) < F(zj),
and given the assumption that ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿m￿1 > ￿m = ￿￿￿ = ￿n ￿ 0, 1 < m ￿ n,
K(F(zj)) assigns higher weights than K(F(zi)) to higher prizes and lower weights
than K(F(zi)) to lower prizes. Therefore K(F(zi)) < K(F(zj)).
Given Lemma (1), at interior solutions for all players we are able to characterise a
monotone equilibrium, in which the contribution is strictly increasing in the endow-
ment. Later on we will identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for its existence
independently of the prize structure.
Proposition 1 Given a vector ￿ of prizes, at an interior solution for all players





Proof. The expected utility of a player from a choice g can be calculated as
E[U(z ￿ g;￿) j g;g￿i] =
z ￿ g + ￿
G
n
+ (Pr[1 j g;g￿i]￿1 + Pr[2 j g;g￿i]￿2 + ￿￿￿ + Pr[n j g;g￿i]￿n)
where Pr[j j g;g￿i] is the probability of a choice g being j-th highest conditional
on the other strategies g￿i. If all agents adopt the same strictly increasing strategy
g(z), then the probability that a candidate with endowment zi is higher ranked
than another randomly chosen candidate is Pr[g(zi) > g(z)] = Pr[zi > z] = F(zi).
Therefore












Now, given the common strategy g(z), we suppose that an individual with endow-
ment z chooses g(^ z) for some ^ z, then her expected utility will be
z ￿ g(^ z) + ￿
G￿i + g(^ z)
n
+ K(F(^ z))
5where G￿i is the sum of the contributions of all the other players. Di⁄erentiating




0(^ z) + K
0(F(^ z))F
0(^ z)
In equilibrium the individual with endowment z should choose g(z) so that the above








A player with the lowest possible endowment z = 0 does not contribute to the public






From Lemma (1) we know that the candidate equilibrium function g is strictly
monotonic increasing.
Assuming that all players rather than i play according to g, we ￿nally need to
show that, for any type z of player i, the contribution g(z) maximises the expected
utility of that type. Let us consider an individual with endowment z. If she plays
g(z) = n
n￿￿(K(F(z)) ￿ ￿n) her expected utility is given by










If she deviates and plays n
n￿￿(K(F(^ z)) ￿ ￿n) for some ^ z 6= z her expected utility
will be


































Therefore she is indi⁄erent to play any other strategy n
n￿￿(K(F(^ z)) ￿ ￿n). If her
action space [0;z] is a subset of the set g￿i this rules out the possibility that she
might be better o⁄ deviating from g(z). If z > g(1) it is easy to show that she
would be worse o⁄ playing any strategy greater than g(1). In fact, playing g(1)
would already guarantee ￿1 and any higher contribution would result in a lower
expected utility.
Notice that the equilibrium strategy function de￿ned in Proposition (1) can be
rearranged as g(z) = 1
1￿ ￿
n
(K(F(z)) ￿ ￿n). The latter is the sum of a convergent
series with reason ￿
n and can be expressed as








6The ￿rst part of the above equation represents the expected prize, in equilibrium,
of a player with endowment z, net of the value of the last prize. This is because





n)m￿1 re￿ ects the return to investment in the public good. In
standard all-pay auctions an agent bids her expected prize in equilibrium. In our
model, if an agent contributes up to her expected prize (net of the last prize) she
receives back ￿
n times the value of her bid because of the public good. This implies
that she will add to her contribution this remaining value, from which she will get
back an equal proportion, and so on.
4 Designer￿ s Problem and Revenue Equivalence
In this section we consider the maximisation problem faced by the designer, assuming
that wealth constraints are non-binding for all players. We will then discuss the
conditions which guarantee the existence of the equilibrium independently of the
allocation of ￿ across the prizes.
Recall that the social planner determines the number of prizes having positive
value and the distribution of the total prize sum among the di⁄erent prizes in order to
maximise expected total welfare net of the value of ￿ (given the players￿equilibrium
strategy functions). In order to analyse the maximisation problem we let the vector
of prizes ￿ be variable, maintaining the assumptions that ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿m￿1 > ￿m =
￿￿￿ = ￿n ￿ 0, 1 < m ￿ n and
n X
j=1




￿j = ￿;￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿m￿1 > ￿m = (2)













Notice that, if ￿ were ￿xed expression (2) would reduce to K(F(z)), as presented
in equation (1). Letting the vector of prizes ￿ be variable, at an interior solution




















5For simplicity of notation, unless di⁄erently speci￿ed, from now on we will refer to ￿(F(z);￿ j
n X
j=1
￿j = ￿;￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿m￿1 > ￿m = ￿￿￿ = ￿n ￿ 0;1 < m ￿ n) as ￿(F(z);￿).
7The social planner faces the following maximisation problem
max
￿ W = n
1 Z
0




0(z)dz ￿ ￿ (3)
Recall that in equilibrium ￿(F(z);￿) represents the expected prize of a player
with endowment z. This means that independently of the distribution of the total





0(z)dz = ￿ (4)












Note that the above expression depends only on the total prize sum and on the
value of the last prize. Finally we can rearrange expression (3) as
max
￿ W = n
1 Z
0








and we can state the following result.
Proposition 2 At an interior solution for all players the social planner optimally
sets the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise expected total contribution is G = n
n￿￿￿
independently of the distribution of the total prize sum among the prizes.
Proof. Expression (6) can be rewritten as
max




















It is obvious that ￿n = 0 maximises the above expression. Further, from equation
(5) we know that total expected contribution equals n
n￿￿￿ when ￿n = 0.
Total expected contribution is higher than the total prize sum. While the stan-
dard result in all-pay auctions is the total dissipation of rent, in our model over-
dissipation occurs because of the marginal return of investing in the public good.
Furthermore, from expression (7) we can see that in equilibrium total expected wel-
fare net of the value of ￿ equals nE[z] +
n(￿￿1)
n￿￿ ￿, where nE[z] represents initial
welfare. This implies that the contest is a budget balanced incentive mechanism:
the social planner does not need to possess ￿ in the ￿rst place, but can simply
detract it from the total contribution.
8Corollary 1 The contest is a budget balanced incentive mechanism. At an interior
solution for all players, provided that the social planner optimally sets the last prize
equal to zero, total expected welfare net of the value of ￿ is higher than initial welfare
and equals nE[z] +
n(￿￿1)
n￿￿ ￿.
So far we have assumed that wealth constraints are non-binding for all agents.
In order for the revenue equivalence to hold the solution must be interior for all
players for any possible distribution of the total prize sum among the prizes. Conti-
nuity together with the assumption that F(z) has a bounded density guarantee the
existence of the equilibrium, independently of the allocation of prizes, if ￿ is small
enough.
Proposition 3 There exists a critical level ￿ ￿ such that the equilibrium strategy
function is interior for all players independently of the distribution of the total prize
sum across the ￿rst n ￿ 1 prizes if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
Proposition (8) in Appendix provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for ￿
to be below such a critical value independently of the distribution of ￿ among the
prizes, provided that the social planner optimally sets the last prize equal to zero.
5 Contest versus Public Provision and Lottery
We are going to compare the result obtained through a contest with both the welfare
generated by public provision and the total contribution resulting from the use of a
lottery.
When socially desirable public goods are not privately provided the obvious
alternative is to publicly provide them. Suppose that the social planner has access
to a budget equal to ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿. Instead of allocating this sum in form of prizes he
provides an amount of public good equal to ￿. We want to analyse how the total
expected welfare generated by public provision compares with that resulting form
the use of a contest as an incentive scheme.
Proposition 4 Private provision of public good via a contest, in which the total sum
prize ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ is distributed among the n￿1 players who contribute the most, Pareto-
dominates public provision. If the social planner uses ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ to publicly provide the
public good the expected total welfare net of the value of ￿ is W P = nE[z]+(￿￿1)￿.
Proof. If the social planner uses ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ to provide the public good the expected









0(z)dz ￿ ￿ = (8)
nE[z] + (￿ ￿ 1)￿
From Corollary (1) we know that, if the last prize is equal to zero, the expected
total welfare generated by a contest is equal to




9which is strictly greater than expression (8).
We now consider the case where the social planner resorts to a lottery to en-
courage contribution to the public good. In order to be able to compare the lottery
mechanism with a contest we will restrict the analysis to interior solutions. To do
this let us assume n players whose endowments are drawn independently of each
other from the interval [z
ﬂ
; ￿ z], with z
ﬂ
strictly positive, according to the distribution
function F(z), which is common knowledge. Assume that the social planner decides
to award the sum ￿ in a lottery with the following properties. If player i with
endowment zi contributes gi 2 [0;zi] she wins ￿ with probability
gi
gi+G￿i, where G￿i
is the sum of the contributions of all the other agents. Player i￿ s expected utility is
given by













(gi + G￿i)2￿ = 0
Assuming that total contribution is di⁄erent from zero6 and rearranging we ob-
tain player i￿ s best response function, given by the following expression
g
￿






Based on equation (9) we can write an expression for the total contribution when
player i plays according to her best response function
G(g
￿






Although endowments are private information, notice that z does not enter the
￿rst order condition. Each player will have the same best response function and the













Setting equations (9) and (10) equal we obtain an expression for G￿i when all







6Notice that in equilibrium the total contribution will not be zero. In fact, if any other player
di⁄erent from i contributes zero, player i will contribute " arbitrarily close to zero and win the
prize.
10Therefore, assuming that wealth constraints are non-binding, in equilibrium all










guarantees that the solution will be interior
for all players. Contrary to the equilibrium we identi￿ed for the case of a contest,
in a lottery all players contribute the same amount (as in Morgan, 2000). Total






These results are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Assume n players whose endowments are drawn independently of
each other from the interval [z
ﬂ
; ￿ z], with z
ﬂ
strictly positive, according to the distribution





the lottery has a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which all
players contribute gL = n￿1
n(n￿￿)￿ and total contribution is GL = n￿1
n￿￿￿.
Note that in order to prove Proposition (7) in the Appendix we have not resorted
to the support of z. The same conditions guarantee the existence of the equilibrium
described in Proposition (1) also when endowments are drawn from the interval
[z
ﬂ
; ￿ z], with z
ﬂ
strictly positive, according to the distribution function F(z), which
is common knowledge, with a continuous and bounded density F
0(z) > 0. In this
case, provided that the social planner optimally sets the last prize equal to zero, the










￿j = ￿;￿1 ￿





We can conclude that for any ￿nite n, when ￿ guarantees interior solutions for
all players in both mechanisms, the expected total contribution raised with a contest
is greater than that obtained through a lottery. The intuition behind this result is
that a lottery can be thought of as a stochastic contest (see Tullock, 1980): the
higher level of noise results in lower total revenue.
Proposition 6 Assume n players whose endowments are drawn independently of
each other from the interval [z
ﬂ
; ￿ z], with z
ﬂ
strictly positive, according to the dis-
tribution function F(z), which is common knowledge. Assume that z is private
information and that F(z) has a continuous and bounded density F





; ￿ ￿], the expected total contribution in a contest, where ￿ is allo-
cated among the n ￿ 1 players who contribute the most, is greater than the total
provision generated by a lottery.
116 Conclusions
Exploring e⁄ective ways to fund public goods is a policy question of great impor-
tance, given the fundamental the role they play in society. There exists an extensive
literature on fund-raising mechanisms based on taxes and penalties. However, so-
lutions to the free-riding problem which do not require coercive power have only
recently started to be studied. In the case of institutions which are unable to en-
force sanctions, such as charities, this di⁄erence may be extremely important. To
our knowledge, this is the ￿rst attempt to analyse multiple prize contests as in-
centive schemes to ￿nance public goods. Further, this recent literature has either
focused on cases where agents are unconstrained or have homogeneous endowments
(e.g. Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Goeree et al. 2005; Orzen, 2005) or predicts that
players with di⁄erent incomes would contribute the same amount (Morgan, 2000).
Contrary to these studies we identi￿ed an equilibrium in which the contribution is
strictly increasing in the endowment.
We considered a linear public good game as it is often employed in laboratory
experiments. The main characteristics of the model are the possibility of awarding
multiple prizes on the one side, and heterogeneity of the endowments and incomplete
information on the other. We assumed that the social planner has access to a small
budget and uses it to implement a contest. The ￿rst prize is awarded to the player
who contributes the most, the second prize to the player with the second highest
contribution and so on until all prizes are awarded. The social planner￿ s objective
function is represented by the expected total welfare net of the total prize sum.
We concentrated our analysis on interior solutions. We found that there exists
a critical level of budget under which wealth constraints are non-binding for all
agents. For any possible distribution of wealth we identi￿ed necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for the budget to be below this critical level. We found that it is optimal
for the social planner to set the last prize equal to zero, but otherwise total expected
contribution is invariant to all con￿gurations leaving the lowest value ￿xed. Further,
a contest is a budget balanced mechanism: the revenue generated is higher than
the total prize sum. Provided interior solutions, we proved that a contest Pareto-
dominates public provision of the public good and performs better than a lottery.
Heterogeneity of the endowments and incomplete information about income lev-
els allowed us to characterise a monotone equilibrium, in which the higher the en-
dowment of a player the higher her contribution. On the contrary, in the case of a
lottery, a symmetric equilibrium arises (as in Morgan, 2000). This is an interesting
di⁄erence which makes the equilibrium of a contest look more realistic than the
latter. Indeed it does seem generally more plausible that richer people contribute
more than individuals with lower incomes.
An interesting extension to the present work would be to test experimentally
the main results of the model. An important question would be to check whether
a contest actually generates a higher contribution than a lottery, and whether the
revenue of a contest is independent of the prize structure. Further, it would be
interesting to test whether a monotone equilibrium would arise, both in a contest
and in a lottery.
12Appendix
We want to ￿nd necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the value of ￿ such that g(z)
is interior for any z on the interval [0;1] for any possible allocation of ￿ among the
￿rst n ￿ 1 prizes. In fact, assuming interior solutions, Proposition (2) assures us
that the social planner will set ￿n = 0.
If we let the vector of prizes ￿ be variable, provided that the last prize is equal




















Let us de￿ne the following object.
De￿nition 1 De￿ne the envelope function




￿j = ￿;￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿n;￿n = 0g
for any z on the interval [0;1].
If we are able to provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for V (z) to be weakly
less than z for any z on the interval [0;1], it will be easy to extend the result to
g(z). In order to do this we will de￿ne some useful concepts that will help us in the
course of our analysis.
De￿nition 2 For any i such that 1 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 1:
1) de￿ne the set Qi ￿ Rnsuch that for every ￿ 2 Qi it holds that ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿




2) call ￿ ￿i the vector ￿ 2 Qi such that ￿1 = ￿￿￿ = ￿i = ￿
i .
De￿nition 3 For any i such that 2 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 1 de￿ne the set ~ Qi ￿ Qi such that
for every ￿ 2 ~ Qi it holds that ￿1 > ￿i.
Obviously ￿ ￿1 2 Q1, characterised by ￿1
1 = ￿;￿1
l = 0 for 2 ￿ l ￿ n, is the only
element of the set Q1 and ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿1) = ￿(F(z))n￿1.
The next Proposition presents necessary and su¢ cient conditions for V (z) to be
weakly less than z on the interval [0;1].
7Hereafter, unlike the rest of the paper, when writing ￿(F(z);￿) we will refer to ￿(F(z);￿ j
n X
j=1
￿j = ￿;￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿n;￿n = 0).
13Proposition 7 ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i) ￿ z on the interval [0;1] for 1 ￿ i ￿ n￿1 are necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for V (z) ￿ z.
Proof. The necessity of these conditions is obvious. In order to prove su¢ ciency
we will have to present some technical results.




j = ￿ and ￿R
1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿R
n;
￿R
n = 0, consider a redistribution of the type ￿￿￿R
i = ￿￿R
i+1, with 1 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 1
and ￿￿R
i > 0, and call the resulting vector ￿S. Then, ￿(F(z);￿S) > ￿(F(z);￿R)
for any z such that F(z) < n￿i









(F(z))n￿i(1 ￿ F(z))i￿1. To see how a redis-


























































Lemma 3 Assume 1 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 2. Consider a vector ￿B 2 ~ Qi+1. If 2 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 2
then ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1) > ￿(F(z);￿B) for any z such that F(z) ￿ n￿i
n . If i = 1 then
￿(F(z); ￿ ￿2) > ￿(F(z);￿B) for any z such that F(z) < n￿1
n and ￿(n￿1
n ;￿ j ￿ 2 Q2) =
￿(n￿1
n ; ￿ ￿1) = ￿(n￿1
n )n￿1.
Proof. Let us ￿rst consider the case in which 2 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 2. The vector ￿ ￿i+1 can
be obtained from vector ￿B applying the following algorithm in i steps.









j ;3 ￿ j ￿ i + 1. Given that ￿B
2 ￿ ￿B
3 it will now be the
case that ￿B1
2 > ￿B1
3 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿B1
i+1. Therefore ￿
i+1 + i￿B1
2 > ￿. The last inequality
can be rewritten as ￿B1
2 > ￿
i+1, therefore we can move to the next step and repeat the
process.















l for 1 ￿ l ￿ j ￿ 1









j+2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
Bj
i+1. Therefore it is the case that 2 ￿
i+1 + (i + 1 ￿ j) ￿
Bj
j+1.
Rearranging the last inequality we obtain ￿
Bj
j+1 > ￿
i+1. This means that we can move
to the next step and repeat the process.
















1 ￿ l ￿ i ￿ 1. Therefore ￿Bi = ￿ ￿i+1.
Notice that from Lemma 2 we know that ￿(F(z);￿Bj) > ￿(F(z);￿Bj￿1) for any
z such that F(z) <
n￿j
n for 1 ￿ j ￿ i. Therefore ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1) > ￿(F(z);￿B) for
any z such that F(z) ￿ n￿i
n , that contradicts our assumption.
Consider now the case in which i = 1. Notice that ￿ ￿2
1 < ￿B
1 and ￿ ￿2
2 > ￿B
2 .
Applying the same algorithm as above from ￿B we will obtain ￿ ￿2
2 after the ￿rst step.
Applying Lemma 2 we know that ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿2) > ￿(F(z);￿B) for any z such that
F(z) < n￿1
n . Further, from Lemma 2 we also know that ￿(F(z);￿ j ￿ 2 Q2) >
￿(F(z); ￿ ￿1) for any z such that F(z) < n￿1
n and ￿(F(z);￿ j ￿ 2 Q2) < ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿1)
for any z such that F(z) > n￿1
n . Therefore, by continuity, we can conclude that
￿(n￿1
n ;￿ j ￿ 2 Q2) = ￿(n￿1
n ; ￿ ￿1) = ￿(n￿1
n )n￿1.
Lemma 4 Assume 2 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 2. ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1) > ￿(F(z);￿ j ￿ 2 Qj) for any z
such that F(z) ￿ n￿i
n and for 1 ￿ j ￿ i.
Proof. The structure of this proof is in three parts.
First of all, from Lemma 3 we know that ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿j) > ￿(F(z);￿ j ￿ 2 ~ Qj)
for any z such that F(z) ￿
n￿j￿1
n and, given that 1 ￿ j ￿ i, for any z such that
F(z) ￿ n￿i
n .
For the second part of the proof, let us ￿rs assume j = 1. Consider a vector
￿B 2 ~ Qi+1. We want to show that ￿(F(z);￿B) > ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿1) for any z such that
F(z) ￿ n￿i
n .
If 2 ￿ j ￿ i, consider a vector ￿B 2 ~ Qi+1 such that ￿B
l = ￿ ￿
j
l for 1 ￿ l ￿ j ￿ 1.
Notice that, obviously, ￿B
j < ￿ ￿
j
l. We want to show that
￿(F(z);￿B) > ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿j) for any z such that F(z) ￿ n￿i
n if 1 ￿ j ￿ i ￿ 1 and
for any z such that F(z) < n￿i
n if j = i.
Vector ￿B can be obtained from ￿ ￿j through the following algorithm in i + 1 ￿ j
steps.




2 = ￿ ￿ ￿B
1 . If 2 ￿ j ￿ i, from vector ￿ ￿j construct vector
￿A1 2 ~ Qj+1 such that ￿A1
l = ￿ ￿
j
l = ￿






































i+1 and ￿Ai+1￿j = ￿B by construction.
15From Lemma 2 we know that ￿(F(z);￿Ak) > ￿(F(z);￿Ak￿1) for any z such that
F(z) < n+1￿k
n . Therefore if 1 ￿ j ￿ i ￿ 1 then ￿(F(z);￿B) > ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿j) for any z
such that F(z) ￿ n￿i
n . If j = i then ￿(F(z);￿B) > ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿j) for any z such that
F(z) < n￿i
n and ￿(n￿i
n ;￿B) = ￿(n￿i
n ; ￿ ￿j).
Finally, from Lemma 3 we know that ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1) > ￿(F(z);￿B) for any z such
that F(z) ￿ n￿i
n . Therefore ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1) > ￿(F(z);￿ j ￿ 2 ~ Qj) for any z such that
F(z) ￿ n￿1
n .
Lemma 5 Assume 2 ￿ i ￿ n￿2. Consider a vector ￿B 2 ~ Qi+1 such that ￿B
1 > ￿B
j ,
with 2 ￿ j ￿ i. Assume a vector ￿C 2 ~ Qi+1 such that ￿C
l = ￿B
l for j +1 ￿ l ￿ i+1
and ￿C







j . If 3 ￿ j ￿ n ￿ 2 then ￿(F(z);￿C) > ￿(F(z);￿B)
for any z such that F(z) ￿
n￿j+1
n . If j = 2 then ￿(F(z);￿C) > ￿(F(z);￿B) for any
z such that F(z) < n￿1
n and ￿(n￿1
n ;￿C) > ￿(n￿1
n ;￿B).




j . Vector ￿C can be obtained from vector
￿B applying the following algorithm in j ￿ 1 steps.









l for 3 ￿ l ￿ i + 1. Given that ￿B
2 ￿ ￿B
3 it will now be the
case that ￿B1
2 > ￿B1
























Therefore we can move to the next step and repeat the process.












l for 1 ￿ l ￿ k ￿ 1 and







j for 1 ￿ l ￿ k and
￿Bk
l = ￿B




k+2 it will now be the case that
￿Bk
k+1 > ￿Bk






l ) + (j ￿ k)￿Bk












j . Therefore we can move
to the next step and repeat the process.















l for 1 ￿ l ￿ j ￿2 and j +1 ￿ l ￿ i+1. Notice
that ￿Bj￿1 = ￿C by construction.
From Lemma 2 we know that ￿(F(z);￿Bk) > ￿(F(z);￿Bk￿1) for any z such
that F(z) < n￿k
n for 1 ￿ k ￿ j ￿ 1. This means that if 3 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 3 then, by
construction, we will have ￿(F(z);￿C) > ￿(F(z);￿B) for any z such that F(z) ￿
16n￿j+1
n . If i = 2 then j will necessarily be equal to 3 and, by construction, we will
have ￿(F(z);￿C) > ￿(F(z);￿B) for any z such that F(z) < n￿1
n . Further it will be
the case that ￿(n￿1
n ;￿C) > ￿(n￿1
n ;￿B).
Lemma 6 Consider a vector ￿C 2 ~ Qi+1 such that ￿C
i+1 = x;￿C
j = ￿￿x
i with 0 <
x < ￿
i+1 for 1 ￿ j ￿ i and 2 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 2. If ￿(F(z);￿C) > ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1) then
￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i) > ￿(F(z);￿C).























n￿1 + ￿￿￿ + (F(z))
n￿i￿1(1 ￿ F(z))
i) > 0


























(F(z))n￿i(1 ￿ F(z))i￿1) and call B
the expression (F(z))n￿i￿1(1 ￿ F(z))i. Inequality (12) is satis￿ed for A
B > i.






A ￿ xB > 0 (13)
Inequality (13) is satis￿ed for A
B > i.
From Lemma (4) we know that ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1) > ￿(F(z);￿ j ￿ 2 Qj) for any z
such that F(z) ￿ n￿i
n and for 2 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 2 and 1 ￿ j ￿ i. In particular, this
means that V (z) will be equal to ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿n￿1) for any z such that 0 ￿ F(z) ￿ 2
n.
For those z such that 2
n ￿ F(z) ￿ 3
n we will have to check the family of functions
￿(F(z);￿ j ￿ 2 Qn￿1) and ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿n￿2). In general, assuming 0 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 3, in
order to ￿nd V (z) for those z such that n￿i￿1
n ￿ F(z) ￿ n￿i
n we will have to check
the families of functions ￿(F(z);￿ j ￿ 2 Qj) for i + 2 ￿ j ￿ n ￿ 1 and the function
￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1).
Consider now a vector ￿C 2 Qi+1 such that ￿C
1 = ￿￿￿ = ￿C
i > ￿C
i+1, for 2 ￿ i ￿
n ￿ 2. From Lemma (5) we know that, for those z such that n￿i
n < F(z) ￿ n￿i+1
n ,
the function ￿(F(z);￿C) is greater than any other function of the family ￿(F(z);￿ j
￿ 2 Qi+1) with exclusion of ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1).
17From Lemma (6) though, we know that if ￿(F(z);￿C) > ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i+1) then it is
the case that ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i) > ￿(F(z);￿C).
Therefore, in order to ￿nd the envelope function V (z) for those z such that
2
n ￿ F(z) ￿ 3
n, it will be su¢ cient to check the two functions ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿n￿1) and
￿(F(z); ￿ ￿n￿2). In general, assuming 0 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 3, in order to ￿nd V (z) for those
z such that n￿i￿1
n ￿ F(z) ￿ n￿i
n we will have to check the functions ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿j) for
i + 1 ￿ j ￿ n ￿ 1.
From this follows that ￿(F(z); ￿ ￿i) ￿ z for 1 ￿ i ￿ n￿1 are su¢ cient conditions
for V (z) ￿ z on the interval [0;1].
Finally, given Proposition (7), by continuity we can establish the following result.
Proposition 8 Provided that the last prize is equal to zero, g(z) is interior for
any z on the interval [0;1] independently of the distribution of ￿ among the ￿rst
n ￿ 1 prizes if and only if n




j = ￿) ￿ z on the interval [0;1] for
1 ￿ i ￿ n ￿ 1.
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